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CHINA CAN WIN!
BY WANG MING
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HE Japanese usurpen have started a new largescale military offensiveagainst China The Chintroop oEer armed resistance to Japanese
sion. China is in flames1 Actually a Sino-Japan= war
an a scale never seen before has already begun.
On July 7, 1937. the Japanese militarists suddenly attacked Lukouchiao and were heroidly repulsed by the
37 th Division of the 39th Chinese Army. In order to gain
time to bring up reserves and to conceal the true plans
of its new military operations from pubIic opinion, the
Japanese militarists hypocritially declared that the
events at Lukouchiao were an "accidental," "local incident." Howwer, subsequent facts have fully revealed the
true purpose of the new offensive launched by the Jap
anese aggressor in China.
T t t E CAUSES OF

THE NEW OFFENSfVE OF THE JAPANESE
MUJTAIUSTS O N CHINA

I t has always k e n the dream of the ruling dasses of
imperialist Japan to establish their rule in China and
compIetely to enslave the Chinese people. The history of
the w i v e actions of the Japanese imperialists in
5

China may be divided into the following four mail1
stages:

First stagefrom the SineJapanese war (1895) to the
world imperialist war ((1914-1918). Zhlfing this time
japan grabbed the Lui-Kiu Islands, Formam, &e Pacadores Islands, the conmion in Kwangtung Region and
Korea-lerritories &at were either a paxt of Ch'~ n aor
under Chineae rule.
The second stag+hm the time of the world imperialist war to the events in Mukden on September 18,
1931. In this p e r i d llle Japanese imperialists seized
K i a d i o w and Tsingtao (at the time German concessions
in China), their troops a d v a n d on the city of Tsinan
and on January 18, 1915, they presented Yuan Shih-kai
with the d l e d Twenty-one Demands, the satisfaction
of which would have meant the virtual transformation
of China into a Japneae colony.
The third s t a g e - h the Mukden events in lgg I to
the events of Lukouchiao in July of the current year.
During these six years the Japanese imperialists seiaed
&me northeastern provinces (i.e., Manchuria) and part
of the territory of m-alled Inner Mongolia (the entire
province of Jehol and six counties of Northern Chahar).
The seizure of Manchuria and Jehol by Japanese imperialism was a terrific economic and political blow to
China.
The fourth stage begins with the Japanex attack on
Lukoucbiao. The immediate and primary objective of
this attack is the seizure of the 6ve northem provinces
of China (Hopei, Chahar, Suiyuan, Shansi and Shantung). The seizure of thae five pmvincm would provide
Japanese imperialism with rich sources of raw material
and extensive marketa, such as never were known in the
6
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history of the Japanese Empire. However, the rnifitary
operations of the Japanese troops in the Shanghai-Naqking district show that this time the Japanese aggreesor
d m not confine his plans to the northern provinces.
The present military operations of Japanese imperialism, after the seizure of Manchuria and Jehol, signify a
new stage in the execution of Tanaka's monsuoua plan
for the complete absorption of China and p v t i o m
for the seizure of lndia and Indo-China, the Philippine
Islands*Indonesia and Australia, as well as preparations
€or a "big war" against the U.S.S.R., the United States
and Great Britain for the purpose of securing the world
supremacy of a Pm-Japanese Empire.
'To conquer the whole of China we must first seize
Manchuria and Mongolia and !o conquer the whole
world we must sehe the whole of China." This is the
idea of General Tanaka which the Japanese fascist militarists are now attempting to carry out.
The open intervention of the German and Italian fas&t aggresom in Spain and the consequent aggravation
.,of the aituation throughout Europe, the policy of actual
toleration of W t p i o n which the British government pursues with reference to Ethiopia and Spain as
well as to China, the position of waiting adopted by the
government of the United States, the helplessness of the
League of Nations in the face of the fascist war incendiaries, the formation of an alIiance between Japan,
C a m m y and ltaly and, finally, the absence, so far, of
real fighting unity of action on the part of the international proletariat, against fascism and war, as a result of
the rejection by the reactionary leaders of the Socialist
IntemationaI of the proposals of the Cornintern-b
are the basic facts in the p f e s e ~ tinternational situation
'J

which facilitate the fulfilment of the predatory plans of
.@e Japanese fascist militarists and encourage
undertake new aggressive operations in China.

them

to

The rise of anti-war and anti-fascist sentiment among
the working masses of Japan, the growth of conflicts
between labor and capital, betwan the landlords and
tenant peasants, the increasing financial dSculties and
the rising discontent of the moderate section of the bourgeoisie with the adventurous policy of the fascist militarists, who are leading the country to complete economic
and military catastrophe--these are the facts of the situation in Japan itself which prompt the Japan= militarists to hasten their aggression on thk mainland. The
fascist militaris~are seeking by their military adventure
against the Chinese people to arouse a fever of chauvinism, to divert the atkncion of the masses from the internal situation in Japan and to establish martial law,
so that they may ruthlessly mush the revolutionary movement and all qqmsitionist forces.
The Japanese militarists are pushing their offensive
on China for the purpose of d i n g the constantly
growing anti-Japanese momnent of the Chinese people.
They have set themselves the task of destroying the central Nanking g o v m n t , of smashing the forces of the
united national anti-Japanese Iront and destroying iu;
main participants, the Kuomintang and the Communist
Party of China. They want to behead and disorganize the
resistance of the Chinese people, in order to make China
their colony.
However, we may confidently say that the braxen aggressors have miscalculatedl China today is no longwhat it was at the time of the Manchurian events. The
C h i n e people are prepared to ofl6er determind resist8

ance to the Japanese militarists. This is shown by the
ment declarations of the head of the Nanking government and Commander-in-Chief of the Chinese army,

Chiang Kai-shek,
Referring to the evma at Lukouchiao, Chiang Kaishek said in his speech at Kuling on July 17 that "the
further development of the Lukou&iao events is a question of the life or death of China," and on July go in
connection with the seizure of Peiping and Tientsin by
the Japanese in an interview with the correspondent of
the CentraI News Agency he de3ared: "Our whole
people, seeing that the country is going through a mitical period, when our very existence is at stake, will fight
to the end as one man."
A portion of the Chinese troops and air f o r e have
already begun national defensive miIitary operations in
Shanghai, Hangchow, Nanking, Nan-&
Hopei and
Chahat against the Japanese a g p w t g . A surilung proof
of the indignation of the Chinese people and its readiness for decisive struggle with the -or
is the fact
that dl the organized anti-Japanese political and militaiy for= of the counuy began to unite with unheard
of speed. Thus at the conference of national defense in
Nanking to which, for the k t time, along with all the
prominent military leaders of the country, the Ieaders
of the Red Army of China, Comrad~Chu Teh, Mao
Tsetung and Chow En-lai were invited, considmable
p r v was made as regards cooperation between the
Kuomintang, the Communist Party and other organizations. Actually the general mobilization of military form,
including the Chinese anti-Japanese People's R d Amy,
for common struggle against the common national enemy
has already started in China.
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CAN CHfNA OFFER SU-FUL

AIIMgD

-ANCE

TO J A P A ACGSUWON?
~ ~

The CommunLt Party of China gave a dear and &rmative answer to this quation in the first days of the Manchurian events. The overwhelming majority of the
Chinese people share this standpoint. But many politid
and mifitsuy men in China because of their "fear of
Japan" and the iduence of pmJapanese dements for a
long time opposed armed resistance to Japanme aggression. T o be sure, the advocates of this m l l e d theory
of non-resistance become fewer and fewer each day.
However, the complete refutation of their arguments is
an imparable part of the general struggle to oqpnia
real military resistan= to the constantly increasing Japanese aggression.
The adv-tes
of the "theory of the impossibiiity of
China winning'' in an armed struggle with Japan maintain that Chin3 which is weak from the standpoint of
military technique and idustry, is as yet unprepared
for armed resistance to a foreign enemy. If China attempts armed resistan= to the Japanese aggmwr it wilt
inevitably share the fate of Ethiopia or, at k t , of Spain.
While arguing in this fashion they deliberately gloa
over the tremendous difFerence that exists between China
and Ethiopia or even Spain, Erom the standpoint of the
forces and resources the country p m e s e for the strugglc
against &heusurper.
It is true that China is weak Erom the standpoint oi
military technique and industry and for this very reason
all the great and even the small capitalist countries beat
us. The leader of all peoples, Stalin, emphasized this
weakness of China's in his report on the results of the
11

First Five-Year Plan. Comrade Stalin said h a t without
industrialization the sinration of the US.S.R. would be
mare or less analogous to the present wition of China,
"which has no heavy industry, has no war industry of its
own and which is pecked at by everybody who cares to

do so." The Chinese Communists well redhe that the
level of heavy industry and the military-technical equip
ment of the army are of tremendous importance in m d ern warfare. But at the same time, as Marxist-Leninists,
they recognize the truth, tested by history, that the outcome of war is decided by living people in the h a 1
analysis.
In order to offer armed resistan= to Japanese imperialism which is armed to the teeth, China must prepare.
But how? The advocates of "the impossibility oE China
winning" reduce this question merely to the puof
arms abroad and the increase of armamem pduction
within the country, for in their opinion until China shall
possess the same armaments as her adversary she cannot
offersuccessful armed mistance to the aggrmor.
The re-arming of China is of course newssary, but
arguments that China cannot resist JapatEW aggression
until China's armaments correspond to those of Japan
are utterly wrong and harmful. They are wrong for the
very reason that China lags far behind Japan in this respect and the latter will not allow China calmly to catch
up with her. The seintte by the Japanese aggressors oi
vast territories in Manchuria and Jehol, with their tremendous riches and resources, has already dealt a severe
blow to China's defenses and now if China were to lose
the five nonhern provinces in addition, as well as the
Shanghai-Nanking area, its capacity to defend itself
would be enormoudy reduced.
12
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What does the i s of Manchuria, JehoI and the five
northern provinces mean for China's defenses? It means
the loss of over one-fourthof total population, over onefifth the entire territory, nine-tenths of all the imn ore
d e p i t s , twethirds of all the railways, four-fifths of a11
the coal mines and one-half of the total md deposits,
one-halfof the entire production of salt. Obviously, if
China cannot defend these rich provinces from Japanese
mupatian, she not only will deliver a huge portion of
her populatio~ito the mercy of Japanese barbarian&.She
not only will lose atcmive territory that will faditate
hostile military operations. She not only will surrender
her rich deposits of coal, iron-ore and salt and her railways into the hands of her mortal enemy. She wiIl at the
stme time be totally deprived of sources of raw material
and the prerequisites for the development of her heavy
and war industry.
Furthermore what would cbe loss of ~h&hai mean
to China? Lt would not only mean the loss of the biggest
economic, industrial, political and cuItura1 city in the
land, but also surrender to the enemy of the main military strategid center, It would mean opening the gateway for the Japanese aggressor to all the rich districts
on the Yangtse River. It would mean a permanent threat
to Nanking, the capital of rbe Chinese republic. If the
Chin- pople cannot defend the Shanghai-Nankingdistrict the aggressor will strike at the very heart of China.
We must dsa tell the advocates d the "impmibility
of China winning" &at the purchase of a r m s and the
reception of w i s t an@ from abroad largely depend on the
powers of resistance and riches of China iuelf at the
present time. It is a bitter truth of our times that no one
considers the weak and those who do not defend them13

selves. And if aEter losing Jehol and Manchuria China
loses its northern provinces, if it loses its important
Shanghai-Nanking area, it will be weaker and poorer
and then there will be less likelihood and opprtunity 01
receiving l m s , arms and other forms of assista~icefrom
abroad.
If, on the contrary, China now seriomly undertakes
the armed struggle in defense of its territorial integrity
and national independence, in the cnurse of the struggle
it can re-arm itself bib wilh its own resources and
through the purchase of arms abroad. The dearest p r d
of this is the struggle of the heroic Spanish people against
the fascist rebellion of Fmnw and the German-Italian
intervention. The area of Spain is incomparably smaller
than that of China; its population is twenty time%smaller
than the population of China.
As regards induslrial development Spain is one of the
most badward countries in Europe. At the outset of iu
military openitions against the fascia: rebels the republican government of Spain had only irregulax detachments
consisting of poorly armed working people. However, as
a result of the cornbind elforts of all the parties and
organizations of the People's Front, and first and foremost of the Communist Party of Spain, as a mulr of the
solidarity and aid of the international proletariat and
the democratic and anti-fascist forces, in the course of a
year's a
d s t w I e the Spanish Republic not only
created a regular army of half a million but also succeeded in providing this army with modern military
equipment. And if the comparatively small Spanish Republic managed to organize its army and acquire the
necessary armaments in the course of armed struggh,
why cannot the enormous Chinese Republic do likewise?

If Republican Spain offers successful armed resistance
to the combined fol-cesd fascist Italy and Germany, why
a n n o t vast China offer successful armed resistance to
the armed forces d the single Japanese aggressor? For
the Japanese aggressor, gave for his milirary technical
advantage in the first period of the war, as regards the
remaitring prerequisites for victory is inferior to the
united narional forces of h e Chinese people.
'The advocates of the "impossibility of China winning''
imagine that the weaker the resistance to the foreign
aggmmr the fewer the sacrifices fpr China. The imfutaWe Iacts of the history of Sino-Japanese relations mmpletely disprove this conclusion of theirs. In 1895 China
o f f d a r ~ h dresistance to Japanese aggression. Although
China was defeated, her territorial losses were compara-

tively small.
I n i 9 1 e r g the Chinese people offered determined
oplmsition to Jzyanese aggression, as a result of which
Japanese imperialism was unable to force China to agree
to her enslaving Twenty-one Demands. In 1931, however, the Nanking government pursued a policy of nonresistance in cotlnection with the Mukden events. As a
result, in a short time Japan occupied the whole of Manchuria and following that, Jehol. This is the biggest territorial lnss that China has sufired in the last hundred

yean*

111 1939 the Chinese 19th and 5th Armies, together
with the Shanghai proletariat and the ~ o b u n b t s of,
fered heroic resistance to the Japan* troop, as a result
of which Cbim saved Shanghai from Japanese -pation. In 1936 the Suiyuan and Shansi troops heroically
npcllcd the so-called combined JapauseMongoIianManchurian tmops and as a result the aggresrsor

'5

was fumed for a time to retreat from t b s e provinca
And now, in connection with the new big Japanese
military invasion, China is faced with the aucial almsrive of either seriously defending its national existence.
which means life, or of not resisting Japanese -ion,
which means death. The Chinew people must ch-

one of the two possible coumes: they must either yield to
the persuasions of th~sewho maintain "the impossibility
of China winning-take the course of non-resistance,for
the alleged purpose of "avoiding excessive sacrifices," and
thereby mcrifice the whole of China to the Japanese
wutpefs, or else they must take the course of the Spanish
people, and even at h e cast of temporary and partial
sacrifices, defend the territory and the riches that have
not yet been lost, and reconquer the lwd and the portion
of the people's wealth that has already been seized by
the ag'gressor, save the working people of China from
the barbarism of the Japanese fascist military clique, save
the whole of the Chinese people from enslavement.
In other words China must either defend and reconquer everything at the cost of partial and temporary
sacrifices or else on the pretext of "desiring to avoid big
sacrifices" actually Iase everything, including national independence, the people's freedom and the country's
wealth. There is no middle course,
Departing from the false assumption of "the i m p
sibility of China winning" the a&-tes
of the "theory
of non-resistance" Further adduce considerations of an
international: character. In their opinion the external
p i t i o n of China is as yet unfavorable for armed resistance to the Japanese aggressor.
Yes, the external position of China t h y is not as brilIiant as we would like i t lo be, from thestandpoint of our
16

country's defense. But Japan's position is no better than
China's. The new Japanese aggression is not only a threat
to the national existence of the Chinese people; it also
menaces the interests of the United States, Great Britain
and France. By its aggressionJapan violates the Covenant
of the League of Nations, the obligations of the Nine
Power Pact and other international agmments; she
facilitates the qgpmion of fascist Germany and Italy in
Spain and throughmt Europe, she endangers the grnera1 peaw.
"The rriruatian is now developing in such a way tbat ro
maintain pace ~hroughautthe world means Arst and foremost ro bring about the defeat of the fascist invndcm in Spain

and China.'"

The aggravation of the external position of Japanese
imperialism facilitates the struggle of the Chinese people.
More than ever before, Japan is isolated in the international arena; her allies, the signatories of the so-cded
antiamintern treaty-fascist Germany and I taly-are in
no p i t i o n to provide Japan with military assistance to
the extent that they would if they were not invoIvd by
their Intervention in Spain. It is unlikely that they will
be able to extend war credits to Japan for they themd v e s are in just as bad financial straits as their fond ally.
And the struggle of the Chinese people against the
aggressor and war incendiary in the Orient, l k e the struggle of the Spanish people against German a d Italian
fascism, is not only the cause of defending the country's
own national existence and freedom. It is an integraI
part of the struggle of the whole of advanced and p m
m v e mankind against fascism and war, for democracy
Gcorgi Dimitroff, Faschm Is War, pp. la-18, Worker# Library
Publishers, New York.
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and peace. The solidarity and sympathy of the world p m
letariat and of all honest, peace-loving and d e m m t i c
forces are on the side of the Chinex people.
Consequently, neither the internal nor the international position of China gives grounds for the assertion
made by the advmtes of the "theory of non-resistance"
that China is in no position to oBer su&l
armed
resistance to J a p e s e aggmsion.
However, it by no means foLlows that the struggle of
the Chinese people against the Japanese trggresisor is an
easy matter, or that China's victory ia guaranteed ahead
of time. The armed struggle of the Chinese people for
the preservation of their national independence encounters tremendous weaknesses and difficulties, which it will
require tremendous &ort to overcome.
The first basic difficulty arises from the far from adequate organization and-unity of the national forces of
China. Although as a result of the constant struggle of
the Communists and the masts, as well as of the efforts
of the progressive eleme-nu within the Kuomintang, the
internal war has recently ceased, and the p
m of the
peaceful unifiation of all anti-Japan- national f m
has begun, the extent of this mifiation is far from what
is required for s u d u l armed resistance to the foreign
enemy. The m a n y - d o n d Chinese people who cornprhe one-6fth of all humanity will become invincible
only when they are united and organized into one irreaistible national force.
The second basic d i i c d t y in the armed struggle
against the aggrasor arises horn China's military technicat backwardness. A1though the Chinese troops display
devotion and endurance in the battle with the foreign
invaders and are greatly superior numerically to the
18
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regular infantry divisions of Japan, they are far inEerior
to their adversary h m the standpoint of military technical equipment. The Chinese air farce, despite the mnsiderable increase in the number of airplanes and the
training of new heroic and skilled fliers, is not yet
adequate
The Chin= navy is weak both numerically and in
quality. The strengthening of the naval forms Eor purposes of coastal defeme is one of the urgent fighting tasks
of the Chinese people and the Nanking government. The
C h i n e troops and the civil population are almost unprepared for chemical warfare while the crtanibaktic
Japanese fascists have already begun to use poison gases
agahst the Chinese people.
Finally, in connmtion with the weak militaty teehnicaI
equipment and lad of experience in modem warfare,
the Chinese troops do not possess adequate military techn i d experts. Although the experience of the Spanish
Republic has shown that similar weaknand dificulties m a y be overcome h the course of the war, they are
most keenly felt in the k t period of the fighting.
The third bask difE-1 ty of the anti-Japanese struggle
lia in the fact that Japanese impendism has had great
experience In espionage and diversion, experience in d e
ception, bribery and intrigue against the oppressed
peoples. In the c o w of decades the Japan- military
political intelligence service ("Special Service Department") hag sumded in planting its numerous agents:
spies, divmionhts, terrorists and provocateum in all the
more or less important military, strategic and politid
points and organizations of China, including a section
of higher political and military circles. Many of these
agents deliberately refrain from activity for the time
PO

being, awaiting the opportune moment to strike a telling
blow at the most vital points.
Finally, the fourth basic weakness lies in the fact that
because of the countrfs economic backwardness,financial
poverty and extremely limited means of communication,
the Chinese troops wilI experience shortages and hitches
in the flaw oE atms, ammunition and provisions and it
will be hard to send up reinforcements and to secure the
swift and timely mobility and maneuvering capacity of
the troops, etc.
Yes, the dificulties and weaknesses of semi-colonial
China in the armed struggle with imperialist Japan are
numerous and extremely serious. And it is therefore the
task of the Communists and the Chinese' people as a
whole to Find the means and the murage to overcome
them. I t would be a crime before the people to flinch
from these difficulties and weakness.
Today the entire Chinese people, save for agents of
the Japanese, national traitors and hopeless cowards and
chatterboxes, are no longer faced with the question of
whether "China must or can offer armed resistance tu
Japanese aggression." Now China is kced with the one
question of how to organize this armed resistance and
how to secure the victory of the Chinese people in this
difficult but glorious struggle for national liberation.
HOW IS THE NAmONWTDE ARMED RESISTANCE OF THE

CHINESE PEOPLE M BE ORGANIZFJI AND HOW fS
ITS VICTORY TO BE S E C U ~ D ?

According to the information of the foreign and the
Chinese press horn the moment of the Lukouchiao events
to the beginning of military operations by the Japanese
troops in Shanghai, that is, prior to August 14, the Kuo21

mintang and the central Nanking government adopted
the following measures in the interests af organizing resistance to the new acts d Japanese aggression:
I . Between one hundred and one hundred and fdty
thousand men were mobilized in Hopei, Chahar and
Shantung to strengthen defense and to help the 29th
Amy.
a. The Iirst conference of national defense was called.
3. An order was pubhhed reinstating Chang Hsuehliang (leader of the Manchurian army) as general, and
readiness was expressed to reinstate General Tsai Tingkai (Commander of the 19th Army) in his post of
command.
4. Under pressure ofpublic protest headed by Madame
Sun Yat-sen the seven arrested leaders of the "All-China
Association of National Salvation" were freed.
5. Work was begun on military defenses in the districts oE Shanghai, Nanking, Wuhan, etc.
6. Commanders for the various fronts were appointed,
Chiang Kai-shek as Commander-in-Chief of all the Nanking troops and Commander of the First Army, on the
front along the Peipiq-Hankow Railway; Fmg Yuhsiang, Commander of the Second Army, on the front
along the Timtsin h k o w Railway; Yen Hsi-shan, Commander of the Third Army, on the S h i S u i y u a n
hnt.
It must be acknowledged that although thee measures of the Kuomintang and the Nanlciig government
do not yet meet the requirements of the situation and do
not satisfy the country's defense needs, they are, nevertheless, a big step forward by comparison with the p i tion and poliiy of the Kuomintslng and the Nanking
government in the recent past.
2%

Only after the Japanese attack on the Shanghai-Nanking district did the Kuomintang and the Nanking government begin more serious armed mistance to Japanese
n p s i o n . The near future will show whether t h ~
KUOinintang and the Nanking government, with the present
composition of their leadership, will be able to organize
this resistance consigtentIy to a victorious finish. We
Communists earnestly h o p that the Kuomintang and the
Nanking government, after fully o v e r c d g the repistance o l the pro-~apaneseelementrs, will lead the mud
struggle against the Japanese invaders to a victorious
finish, together with us and together with the whole
Chinese people.
The Communist Party of China for its part, deeply
aware of its responsibility for the fate of the working
class and of the entire Chinese people, has pers$tently
advocated the slogan "Expel Japanese imperialism £ran
China," which it advanced at the very beginning of
Manchurian events in 1931, and, step by step, beginning
with the Manifesto of August, 1935, and ending with
I he latest declarations regarding events in North China,
it has offered concrete proposals, based on the policy of
creating a single national anti-Japanese front by means
ol which the Chinese people will not only offer serious
a~metlresistance to Japanese aggression but will secure
the victory.
What concrere proposals and demands do the Chinese
Communists advance in their declarations and appeals?
First, "thc col laboralion of all anti-Japanese parties
a t ~ dgroups of China on the basis of the colIabo~+ation
of the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, to resist
lapan and save the country." The collaboration of all
parties and groups in China, based on a political agree23

ment as regards the common struggle against the commorI enemy, assumes the retention of their politid and
organizational independence by all the parties to the
agreement: the Kuominmng, the Communist Party and
other political organizations.
Indeed, according to the Iatest reports in the foreign
press the ccihboration between the Kuomintang and the
Communist Party is making rapid p-if
this is true
we must welcome i t in every way. But in the interests of
the Chinese people as a whole we must frankly advise
certain leaders of the Kuomintang to abandon their mistaken efforts to transform collaboration between the
Kuomintang and the Communist Party of China into the
p o l i t i d and organizational subordination of the Communist Party to the Kuomintang. They must also abandon their mistaken policy of ignoring the other antiJapanese political groups and organization ksides the
Communist Party and the Nanking Kuomintang. They
must recognize the necessity of forming a united front
with these groups and organizations and give up their
efforts to make coIlaboration with these groups involve
their forcible subordination to the Kuomintang and the
Nanking government.
Such an attitude on the part of certain Nanking
Ieaden to the solution of this question that is vital to the
country and the people only binders and delays the fomation of a single anti-Japanese national front composed
of all the truly popular forces of China. Deliberately or
otherwise, these leaders hinder the work of organizing
real armed resistance to the Japanese aggmsor and play
into the hands of the latter.
Second, "the formation of an allChina government of
national defense and a singIe all-China democratic re24

1

D

public." There are now reports to the effect that the
Kuomintang intends in the near future to reorganize the
Nanking government in this d k t i o q . Thia is very well
and we a n only welcome it. But to hasten this work we
must thoroughly ex&
various slanderous legends and
wrong arguments. First of all the legends spread by proJapanese elements to lhe effect that the slogan €or the
formation of an all-China government ofnational defense
means the overthrow of the existing central Nanking
government is utterly false and unfounded. It is slander
and provomtion! At the present time only the Japanese
qgmmr arid his agents are interesred in the overthrow
of the. Nanking government.
We Chinese Communists openly dedare that we support the Kuomintang and the Nanking government and
that we will fight Japanese imperialism together with
them shoulder to shoulder.
A wrong and scho1asdc assertion is made by certain
incorrigible chatterboxa to the effect that the slogan for
the formation of an all-China government of national
defense means the Eonnation of a government which
must necmarily awume the title of all-China govemment of national defense and that othemise it will nat
be such a government. Formalists! It is not a question
of names but of essence1 The assertions of chose who say
that the existing Nanking government has long s i n e become an all-China government of national defense are
also incorrect. No, the Nanking government has only
now partially begun to carry out the mks of national
defense. But it has not yet become a truly allChina
'government of national defense such as the military situation warrants and such as all advocates of a united antiJapanew national front demand.
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The Nanking national government nl~tst bccomc a
truly allChina government d national defense and it
can, provided it w
g
e
s its policy in the direction of a
(letermined struggle for national. independence, for the
democratization of the regime and the improvement or
the material conditions of the masses, by removing proJapanese elenhenu from the government and by drawing
into the government the m l y authoritative militant antiJapanese leaders from the respective parties, groups aria
organizations, as the situation warrants and in conformity with the wishes of the latter.
Only this type of authoritative and frghting government, tagether with the convening of an all-China parliament based on universal suErage and universal d m
cratic liberties, can truIy cope with the responrible,
difficult and complex task 01national defense, with which
it is entrusted by qm,mo,c~w,people. Only this type ot
d-China government of national defense can secure the
universal mobilization of a 1 the military, human and
economic forces of the whole country for the sacred
armed struggle of the entire Chinese people against the

Japanese aggressor.
The immediate liberation of all political prisaners,
the repeal of all anti-popular and antidemmtic laws,
the further amendment of the laws and conditions that
govern the convening of the National .Uembly, the
radical alteration of the d d t of the Constitution of the
Chinese Republic, the immediate inwoduction of broad
dcrnocratic liberties for all citizens (with the exception of
national traitors and Japanese agents), in a word the
transformation of China into a truly united allGhini
republic-these measures will swiftly and effectively
facilitate the establishment of mutual trust between the
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people and the government and thereby increase China's
power of national defense many times.
Third, the "unived mobilization of all military divisions and the formation of a united allChina anti-Jap
anese army." A successful armed ~rn-e
against the
Japanese aggressor requires the universal mobilization of
all-China's military divisions and for this it is necessary
to form an a1bChina united anti-Japanese army by
uniiing all the armed form of China, i.e., all the central
Nanking armies, all the provinaal armies, the anti-Japanese people's Red Army, the Manchurian anti-Japanese
people's armies, etc., with a single -and,
a single:
discipline, a single system of supplies and armaments and
a single militay plan for coordinating operations against
the common enemy.
The Nanking government and Chiang Kai-shek have
to a degree undertaken to form such an army. We naturally welcome this step. The Red Army and its commanding and political statf, led by the Central Committee of
the Communist Party of China, has often confirmed its
sincere readin= to enter the all-china united national
revolutionary army as a component paxt, not only in
words but in deeds.
But the formation of a united allChina army has long
been delayed because in recent years when the mutual
struggle had alrestdy virtually ceased, certain leaders of
the Nanking A r m y and certain Nanking politicians
sought to utilize the slogan of the formation of a united
national anny in order to weaken and reduce the fighting
strength of the anti-Japanese national Red Army. For
example, they demanded the resignation of the f o m t ,
m a t capable leaders and organizers of the Red Army,
Comrades Chu Teh and Mao Tsemng, the reduction
a8

and curtailment of the size of the anti-Japanese people's
Red Army, the removal of all s t d € leaders of d l the
divisions of the Red Army and the appointment of
others, etc. Does this correspond to the general interests
of the strumle against Japan and the cause of forming
a united national army?
According to the latest information the Nanking government and the Kuornintang have already withdrawn
several of their demands and the Red Army, in order
to hasten the formation of the united Chinese Army ancl
further the common sm&gIeof the anti-Japanese Eront,
has already officially complied with the ordem of Nanking on the appointment of its commanding staff and on
the designation of the Red Army as a part of the national revolutionary army. 'This is a big step forwad in
the formation of a united allChina army.
Another serious obstacle to the formation of a united
people's revolutionary army is the fact that some of the

Nanking leaders have attempted, in the name of the
formation of a united national revolutionary army, to
weaken the strength of the locaI troop, while at the same
time a m i o n of the local military leaders, who have
long been accustomed to regard their troops as their
" p s o n a l capital," are reluctant to merge their military
forces with the united alI-China anti-Japanese m y . We
must frankly tell these miIitsuy Ieadeni in the mtet and
in the localities that at the present time the nrtiod selfconsciousness of all the fighters in the Chinese Army is
constantly increasing.
Tlky d i z e that their sacred duty lies not in p m ing blind obedience to "their generals," but in mnsdou~
ly performing the glorious task of defending the country
and the- peopIe. Significant in this connection is the be29

havior of the 38th Division of the 29th Army during the
recent events, when its commander Chang Tsudung,
a pwJapanese agent, refused the request of his officers
and soldiers that he order the division to resist the Japanese troops. Against the will of its commander the 38th
Division, under the command of the best officers, voluntarily went in a body to assist the 97th Division in defending the Peiping-Tientsin dishict from t h e Japanese
aggressor.
This is the ideal time to test all the military leaden
of China. If under the present conditions anyone proves
himself a traitor and a coward, if anyone opposes action
against the Japanese, he will be despised by everyone
as an unworzhy military leader, as an unworthy son of
his country.
Fourth, "universaI ~nobilizationof the entire Chinese
people," China's military force alone is far from enough
for a truly successful armed struggle against Japanese imperialism. What is needed is the universal mobilization
of the entire able-bodied Chinese population, of all men
and women, young and old, for a ct,mmon struggle to
attain a common goal.
The line of the Communist Party, which was expressed
in its appeal of August 1 (1935)~
must become the directive of mobilization: "Let those who have much money
give their money; let those who have much arms furnish
their arms; let those who have bread and rice give their
bread and rice; let those who have g o d health give their
strength a d energy unsparingly; Iet those who have
special training utilize their training. LRt the entire'people be mobilized in this manner!"
Fifth, "the universal arming of the whole Chinese
people." The military operations of rhe Japanese avia80

tion, infantry and naval forces have already shown with
fuU clarity that in modern warfare the rear differslittle
from the front. Therefore we must arm our people with
dl the available weapons, that they shall not only be in
a podtion to defend themseIva at any place and at any
time fram the surprise attacks of the Japanese and their
agents but may also provide the necessary aid to our troops
on the front and carry on partisand a r e and diversionist
work in the enemy's rear and on his flanks,etc. Right nAw
thc Nanking government and the local authorities must
first of all arm the milIions of working people of Shanghai, Tienain, Pciping, Hangchow, Wuhan, Tsingtaa and
other big cities of the country as well as the peasant
masses of the nurthern provinces, the K i q u G h e k i a n g
and Fukien-Kiangsi districts. The combinatian of the
auxiliary operations of the armed masses with the military operations of the mops on the basis oE a general
milimy plan is the only way to secure the expulsion of
the Japanese invad'm from China.
Sixth, "univerrsal mobilization of the country's entire
economy and the adoption of an economic policy of national defense." Anyone can see the tremendous impox. lance of the universal mobilization of all the country's
economic, financial and raw material resources in modern
warfare. T h i s task is especially urgent in China, which
is backward economically and which must wage a long
and drawn-out war on a vast scale with Japanese imperialism. In this connection we Chinese Communists
still have a lot of serious work to do together with our
ally, the Kuomintang, in order to mobilize and organize
the country's entire economy in conformity with the
requirements and conditions of national defense.
Seventh, "searing and improving the material a n 31

dition of the masses." The masses of China live in poverty, every year millions perish from hunger, floods.
drought and other calamities. The chatter about the
alleged impossibility of any form of improvement in the
Iiving conditions of the masses during the war-time must
be discarded as a pernicious theory. Yes, in wax-time it
is difficult to improve the materid cmditions of the
mass^& During the nationwide defensive suuggle people
must endure great sacrifices. But the provision of elementary living conditians, t he improvement of the intolerable
situation of the working rnasses during the nationwide
armed struggle, is noL only possible but is absolutely
necessary in the interests of the struggle.
At the present time hundreds of thousands of Chinese
workers and employees who were previously employed
in the Japanese enterprises have left their situations in
sign of protest and as a boycott of the national enemy.
But unempIoymeat means hunger. 1s it impossible to
provide tbese hundreds of thousands of vanguard fighters
with a livelihood? Of course it is pmsible.
This year in many districts of &na the peasants again
suffer from drought and crop failure. Is it imposible to
give elementar). aid to the starving and impoverished
peaants? Of course it is possible. We must also give s p tematic aid to the many millions of unemployed and

impoveridwd artisans, ctc
Eighth, "the adoption of a policy of national defense
education and of aid to the unemployed and illirerate
yonth." China has tens of millions of illiterate workers
and peasants, and the system of edu~ationis far from
satisfying either the requirements of the students themselves or those of the state. Therefore in recent years
China has witnessed a big, mass movement of the youth,
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led by the best and outstanding scientific and educational
kaders, advoating a policy of national defense education and of aid to the unemployed and illiterate youth.
The main objectives of this movement are the following:
I. The improvement of the educational system in the
direction of developing the national consciousness of the
youth and its determination to fight against the foreign
enemy for the salvation of the country;
2. The reorganization of the educational system to
mdom with the requirements of national defense and
the training of specialists in the various fields,
3. Freedom of conscience and of study, struggle against
the compulsory training of the youth in the spirit of
ideas that are hostile to the people and to the nation;
4. Military training for the youth and the students;
5. The provision oE work for those who have finished
their studies and aid to students, etc
The Communist Party of China fully endorses this
movement of the youth and the best section of the
Chinese intelIectuals, and it has included these demands
in its own general program for a united national front
of resistance t Japan and for Lhe salvation oE the
country.
Ninth, "confiscation of all the property of the Jap
m e aggressor and his agents and the datruction of
Japanese spies and national traitors." The conbation
of all the property of the Japanese aggressor and his
agents will deprive our enemies of an economic foundation in China; the means thus confismted will go to
defray a part of the military expenditures and to pn>vide aid for the anti-Japanese fighters and their families.
I t is generally recognized that Japanese agents infest
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the state, military and party apparatus of the Kuomintang and of other organizations, centrally and locally.
If the Kuomintang and the Nanking government have
definitely decided to wage an armed struggle with the
Japanese aggressor they musi not auow their apparatus
to be infested by Japan- agents, especially in its most
responsible links. And if thk be true why do those open
and dastard1y traitors of the Chinese people, the Trntsk yitcs, s!ill carry on their filthy, subversive, diversionist and
spying work on behail oE the Japanese secret service,
with impunity, in Shanghai, Nanking, Sian and elsewhere? For i t is a generally known and incontrovertible
fact that the Chinese Trotskyites are employed by the
Japanese secret service.
Is not 111e counter-revolutionary slogan to the effect
that China's main enemy is not Japanese imperialism
but the Co~nmunistParty of China and the AII-China
Association of National Salvation directly dictated by

the Japan= secret service?
Is not the Trotskyite slogan of "an alliance with Japan
for the stn~ggIeagainist the Communist Party and Chiang
Kai-shek" a direct appeal of the Japanese aggressor to
destroy the Communist Party and the Kuomintang?
Is not the Trotskyite line "on the necessity of waging
the national, revolutionary war in China not onIy against
Japanese impridism, but at rhe same time, against
all the imperialist powers" directed towards isolating
China from Europe and h e r i m , in order to facilitate
the Japanese seizure of China?
Is not the Trotskyite propaganda of the notorious
anti-leninist theory on the impossibility of national rev+
lutionary wars in the period of imperialism, plus the
ft~riousattacks of the Japanese-Trotskyite agents an the
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slogan of die Chinese Communist Party for a national
revolutionary war against Japanese imperialism, a k
t
fulfilment of the Japanese instructions to preach the
"theory d nan-resistance" in China?
Is not the Trotskyite slogan on the "necessityof simultaneously waging a civil war against the i n m d enemy and
a national revolutionary war against the external enemy"
and the "impossibility and inadmhability of any united
fmnt between the Communist Party mct the Kuomintang" a cynical application of the Japanese policy of
"conquering Chino with the hands of the Chinese themselves," and of not letting the national f o m of China
unite far the common struggle against Japanese aggmsion under any conditions? The late national writer Lu
Hsen was profoundly c o r n when he-declared that "Japanese imperialism entirely welcomes the views of the
Trotskyites in China"
During the Sian events the Japanese Trotskyite agents
headed by the bandit C h q Mu-tao made every efEort
. to stir up war between Nanking and Sian. These same
agents subsequently killed General Wmg I-tse, a famous
national hero who was the fint member of the high
command of the Chinese army openly and honestly to
establish the united anti-~a~anese
front with the Communist Party and the Red Army.
The Trotskyites, headed by the thrice-accursed renegades Huang Pirtg and Chang Mu-tao, receive $ ~ , o o o
a month from the Japanese secret service in North China
to organize a so-called "new party" and to carry on their
wrecking work. The Tmtikyite representative Chang
Mu-taowa9 included in the w-caIled delegation of friendship with Japan and went to Tokyo with the letter. The
II'rotdyi~&Shieh Nuonahan, Cheng Hsiao-cba and the

blood-thirsty murderer Jen Tso-bum (alas Yeh Ching)
pubIish special papers and magazines, with Japanese
money, which spread aIl kinds of slander against the
Communist Party, the Kuomintang and the anti-Japanese mass organizations.
Do not all t h m facts prove the full correctness of our
great writer Lu Hsen who said that "by their conduct
the Trotskyites are unworthy to be modern Chinew"?
Do not all thee facts show that the Trotskyites by agreement wit11 the Japanese secret service are helping Japanese imperialism to seize China? Do not these facts prove
that the Trotskyites are not onIy the enemies of the
Communist Pany, but the enemies of the whole Chinese

people?
AU theae facts fully confirm the words of the great
leader of all working humanity, Comrade Stalin, to the
d e c t that modern "Trotskyism . has changed
into
a frantic and unprincipled gang of wreckem, diversionists, spia~and murderers acting on the instructions d the
intelligence services of foreign states."*
The Chinese people and international public opinion
will judge the extent to which the Kuomintang and the
Nanking government, as well as the local military and
political authorities, are determined and prepared for
armed struggle with the Japanese aggmsor, by their
attitude towards all Japanese agents and national traitors.
including the Japanese-Trotskyite fascist agents. The
government and the people of the U.S.S.R. have given
us an exarnple of how to fight against the foreign inteL
ligence service and purge the state military and Party

..

* Jawph Stalin, Mastering Bolshcuisrn, p.
PuhIishers, New York.
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apparatus of these vermin, thereby strengthening its defenses and securing its rear in case of an attack by foreign aggressors.
Tagether with the above nine slogans and fhe demands on internal policy, the Communist Party also
advanced the slogan on che "adoption of an antiJapanese foreign policy." The Central Committee of
the Communist Party of China and the Central Executive Committee of the Chinese Soviet Republi~in their
appeal of August I, 1935, proposed a spedal point on
foreign policy which 4 1 s for "the establishment of contact with all peoples that are hostile to Japanese imperialism (with the Japanese working people, the Koreans,
Form&,
etc.), for a -on
~truggleagainst the common enemy, the estabSuhment of an alliance with all
nations and states which support and sympathize with
the national strugale of the Chinese people and of cordid
relations with a11 powers and nations which maintain a
Eriendly neutrality in the miIitary operations between
Japanese imperialism and the Chinese people."
And in one of its latest declaratiom regarding events
in Northern China the Central Committee of the Chinese
Communist Party p r o m to the Nanking government
that i t immediately adapt an active anti-Japanese foreign
poiicy, that it sup rt the international peace front and
that it enter all o m of agreements with other countries which would benefit the cause of the anti-Japanese
struggle.
The appliation of the b e measures in the sphere
of internal and foreign policy will not only enable the
Chinese people to organizc truly nationwide armed resistance, but to ~ecure the victory over the Japanese

._

P"

aggressor.
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THE TASltS OF THE CObdMUNlSt PARTY OF CHINA
UNDER PRBSEMT CONDmONS

The struggle of the Chinese people is entering a new
period-the period of the direct organi~atioaof suful nationwide armed resistance to Japanese aggression.
If in the preceding period the main task was to end
the civil war in the country on behalf of a unanimous
smuggle against Japan= imperialism, now, when the
armed struggle with the Japanese aggressor h a already
begun, the main task is to organize the nationwide armed
resistance to the point of the complete expulsion of the
Japanese invaders from China
If in the preceding period the CommuJ s t Party of
China only succeeded in laying a oertain foundation for
the establishment of a united anti-Japanase front with
the Kuomintang and with other organizations, it is now
directly fighting for the speedy and the complete formation of this united national anti-Japanese front, through
the establishment of collaboration of p o l i t i d parties
and organizations and the creation of a united aIl-China
democratic xepublc with an allgovernment of
national defense and a united aUChina anti-Japanae
army*
~i previously the question of the organization of successf ul nationwide military res$ tance to Japanese aggression still faced the Communist Party in perspective,
today it has become the immediate and urgent task.
And from this it follows that if previously che Communht Party of China concentrated its attention and its
work for the most part on the Red A r m y and the Soviet
districts and relied mainly on their forces, at the present
time our Communist Party must not only concern itself
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with strengthening and increasing the forces of the Red
Army; it must also see to it that the best traditions and
lighting qualities trf the latter, as h e mtwt advanaed,
d i ~ i p l i n dand
, compact component part of the all-China
army, are preserved. The Communist Party of China will
not only be concerned with improving work in the Soviet districts so as to make them a buttress of the anti-

Japanese struggle, but, relying on the growing revolutionary strength and might of the millions of working
p p l e aU over China, it wilI stmggle to mnsform other
districts throughout the muntry into strong foundations
for the a l l a i m democratic republic.
This means that in the first phce the Communist
Party of China must devote tremendous &OK to the
education and organization of the working class miUions,
who at the present t d e are again beginning to take an
active and open part in the anti-imprialist struggle
of national liberation as the must advanoed, the most
chs-conscious and the most consistent detachment of
the entire Chinese people.
TThe C h i n e Communists realize that work among
the workers and among the made unions in the main
centen of the muatry WBB extremely weak in the previous
period. Now, however, as a result of the growing class
consciousness and organization of the working class and
its activity and initiative, the mass in0uene and the
base of the Communist Party gruw and strengthen md
the nationwidt struggle against the Japanese aggressor
will become more and more powetIul.
Second, t h e Communist Party of China is faced with
the task of organizing and dmwing the b r d p e m t
which comprise the ovemheIming majority of
the Chinese people into the nationwide and general

-
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democratic struggle. The Chinese Communists realize
that for all their rich experience of work among peasants,
save in those districts where the Red Army was or now is,
they have on the whole done very little to organize the

peasants. Yet the more broadly and the more e h i v e l y
the peasant masses are organized and the more actively
they are involved in rhe revolutionary struggle, the
stronger will be the a n t i - J a p w national liberation
movement and the mom -in
its s u d u l issue.
Third, the Communist Party of China is f a d with
the task of strengthening a d extending its work among
the Chinese youth in general and among the student
youth in particular. The Chinese Communists realize
that work among the youth is especially weak. The
Chinese youth are deeply imbued with the spirit of
national liberation; they take their stand heroidly and
devotedly on the front line oE the anti-Japanese struggle
and they are destined to play an important role in
the struggle of the Chinese people for national liberation.
Fourth, the Communist Party of China is faced with
the task of organizing its rnembe~sand all honest revlutionary elements in all sections of the national revolutionary m y in order to raise the fighting spirit d the
army and suengihen revolutionary military disciplne,
to provide examples of heroism and s e l f h f i a e and to
secure the mutual moperation of the people and the
army in the hard but historic struggle with the mortal
enemy.
Fifth, the Communist Parry of China is faced with
the task of strengthening its influence and its work in
Manchuria and Jehol, The Communist Party can be
proud of the fact that Communists, despite great hard4'

ships and tremendous sacrifices, work and struggle in
Manchuria and Jehol.
In the fulfilment of its great historical revalutionary
tasks our Chinese Communist Party inevitably encounters many difficrulties. These dif16culties are connected
with the need for c;urying on-

". . . the struggle against Japanese imperialism, armed as i t
to the teeth-a crafty enemy which is dwerly dipming
the form of China and malting use of every inte.rna1 struggle
id

in this wuntry for its uwn robber en&."#

These difficuIties also arise from the fact that in China
there exist certain representatives of the propertied
classes, who like the French bourgeois leaders in the
period of the FrancoPrussian war of 1 8 7 1,~place Lhe
selfish interest^ of their classes above their nationd duty,
who readily commit national treason and who, under
certain conditions, will assist the foreign fm in his
struggle against the Chinee working class, against the
Chinese people.
"But there are also internal -ti=
in the path of the
Communist Pgrty of China. It has to overcome the resistance
of sectarian dements, who do not undmtand that in the
prcrent conditions thc only way to secure the liberation of the
C h i n e people is that of establishing a united national front
against the Japanese violators. It a h bm to
on a

auuggle agairsnr the opportunist opitulators who are m d y ra
sacrifrw the political and organizational independence of the
Party and the Red Army, and to disoIw them in other
organizadona"*

The first difficulty of an inner-party nature is con-

.

Tha Communist httrrnational, O c t o k , 1936. Georgi
Dimi troff, "The Fifteenth Ar~tliversary of tbe Communist Party
of China "
1939.
** ~ i 8 ; p rl(o.
.
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nected with the fact that in recent years ~ h cChinese
Co~nmunistParty has made a sharp palitid turn, such
as was scarcely experienced by m y other section of the
Cornintern. Instead of the previous armed struggle with
the Kuomintang, the Communist Party now fights for
co:oUaborationwith the Kuomintang and the other organizations. Instead of the dviI war of the Red Army with
the Kuomintang and non-Kuomintang troops which
lasted for nearly ten years, the Communist Party n m
struggles for the unification of the Red Army with all
other Chinese troops in a united allChina national rev*
Iutionaty army. f nstead of the previous a
d struggle
for the overthrow 01 the Nanking government and the
establishment of an ail-China Soviet government the
Communist Party now fights for the formation of a single
all-China government together with the Kuomintary: and
the Nanking government, for the formation of a united
a U a i a a democratic republic with an all-China government of national defense.
At the same time the Communist Party openly wi&d m its slogan d the Sovietization of China at the
present stage of the struggle of the Chinese peapie.
Although so far the Communist Pany is making this
political turn with comparative s u m it would be
wrong to say that its ranks do not still include a considerable number oE people who, because of the sharpness of
the turn, are caught in the snares of ideologiwl confusion and practical error. Now more than ever before
the Communist Party must wry on a most serious
idmlogial struggle and improve the Marxist-Leninist
theoretical training of its forces.
T h e Chinese Communists, like true sons of their
people, rake their stand on the front lines, in defense
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of China's national exhence and national independence,
but this does not mean that the Chinese Communists
have been transformed into bourgeois nationalists or
that they have been b l v e d in the ranks of the latter.
There always has been and always will be an impassable
barrier benveen the Cammunis~ and the bourgeois
nationalists. While we take a most decisive stand in
defense of the national interests of our people, we
remain true revolutionary internationalists and consistent
proletarian tighten.
While we d d a m ourselves, d ~ p i t ethe dilferences in
principle that exist between communigm and Sun-Yatsen-ism. advocates af the basic revolutionary slogans of
Sun Yat-sen, of the best revolutionary traditions of the
Chinese people, we Communists never for an instant
under any circumstances cease to be true foIlowers of
the Mamist-kainast teaching.
While we take our stand under specifichistoric conditions for the formation of a united national front with
the Kuomintang and the other organizations on the basis
of a common platform for a common struggle against
a common enemy, we Chinese Communists wilI never,
under any circumstances, e w n for an instant, tolerate
the lass of the political and organizationat independence
of our own Party, or the roncealment of our own Communist face and banner.
"Thc Communist Party of Cbina, while loyally and honestly
fulfilling Its obliptions acmrding to the agreement undertaken
fy it repding h e struggle against the usurpers. docs not intend to talrc either the path of blind faith in itn allies, or thc
path of mpitulation.".

I

While we actively favor the creation of a united allChina democratic republic and the calling of an allChina parliament, under the specific historic conditions,
we Chinese communist^ are never, under any circumstances, men for an instant, transform& into bourgeoisdenlocrau ant1 ;ve rlo not &ase to be consistent advncates
of Soviet power and of socialism.
The aemd d i 5 d t y of an inner-Party nature arises
from the necessity of re-eduating the old Party f w
in conformity with the new tasks, of training m*dpromoting new Eolres from among cbe activists and leaders
of ihe m a s revottttianary movement who have develo p d in recent yeal-s. The majority of the present forces
oE the Communist Pang of China were u a i d and
tempered in the civil war. Many of them are of peasant
origin. They have had experience in armed suuggle
against lllc Kuomintang and its armies, but many of
them llttctly lack experience in the struggle for h e
masses tlnder conditions where there % neither a Soviet
power nor a Red Army and have not the remotet. concept of the working dm movement in big cities. Therefore the education of old Party forces in vnformity
with new conditions and methods of work is a far horn
easy matter.
A task of no less importance is the training and promotion of new forces, primarily from among the workers. In recent years many activists and leaders uE the
mass anti-Japanese movement and the strilce suuggle
have p w n up and developed. f t is among them that
the Communist Party can and must recruit fresh forms
and new reserves, its new fighting f-,
directly linked
with the broad masses and possessing new experienca
of struggle and work. The Party has helped them and
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will help them, for the Communists value every honest
and capable son of the people.
h the process of the national revolutionary atruggIe
many of the present activists and leaders of the antiJapan- movement will become acquainted with the
theory and pmctice of Communism; they will draw
c l w r and,cIoser to our Party and will in the near future
become sons and daughters of the great Communist
Party. Some d them have already joined the Communist Party of China. But not all active participants in
the anti-Japanese movement a n be Communists. The
desire and determination to take part in the anti-Japanese struggle in themseIves are far from sufficient lo
warxant being a member of the Communist Party. Communists are not only fighters in the national revolutionary movement but cornistent lighters for the libemtion of the working clasa and of a11 working mankind,
that is, tighten for the dictatomhip of the proletariat, for
Soviet power and for communism.
The third difficulty of an inne~Partynature arises
from the fact that under the preent condit ions-the
cesation of the internal war and the beginning of the

nationwide armed struggle of defense-the enemia of
rhe Chinese revolution, and first and foremost the Japanese secret service, will inevitably d o u b l e its &orts
co penetrate the r a n t of the Communist Party with its
agents, provocateum, diversionists, terrorists and wreckers, who are recruited primarily from among the cond e d Trotskyites, the fo1lowers of Chen Tu-hsiu, Lo
Tsian-lung, etc., so as to destroy from within the power
and strength of the most revolutionary and the most
military party, of the party which they fear the most, the
Communist Party of China. This churnstance is all
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the more dangerous because revolutionary vigilance and

I
I

systematic struggle against p x m t i o n and apionage
are extremely weak and insufficient in our Party's ranks.
The Party organizations, including the leading ones, do
very little to verify their forces.
China is passing through the m a t serious and the
most critikl 3 tate in its history. Tremendous difficulties
stand in the way of the great s-le
to organize a nationwide armed resistance to the J a p e s e a g g e m x , to
defend China's national existence and the cause of gem
era1 peace. The entire Chinese people, every political
party and group, every politid, military and public
leader of China, is mnfronred today with a audal test.
The Chinese Communists, true followers of M m , Engels, Lenin and Stalin, the great teachem of the working
class and of all working mankind, and worthy sons and
daughters of their people do not flinch from these aculties and will find the way to overcome them. Together with the entire Chinese people, with the solidarity
and support of the entire international proletariat and
of all prog&i~e mankind, the Chinee Communists
have confidently and definitely e n t d the big historic
battles with Japanese imperialism for a great new, in.
dependent, free and happy Chinese Republic!
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